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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
- and - CASE NO. CP-810 
HARRISON CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
- and -
HARRISON ASSOCIATION OF TEACHERS, 
Intervenor. 
In the Matter of 
HARRISON ASSOCIATION OF TEACHERS, 
Petitioner, 
- a n d - CASE NO. CP-820 
HARRISON CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
- and-
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (JEROME LEFKOWITZ of 
counsel), for Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO 
CP-810&CP-820 -2 
INGERMAN SMITH, LLP (GUS MOUNTANOS of counsel), for 
Employer 
NEW YORK STATE UNITED TEACHERS (JONATHAN D. RUBIN), for 
Harrison Association of Teachers 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
These cases come to us on exceptions filed by the Harrison Association of 
Teachers (Association) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) 
granting the unit clarification petition (CP-810) filed by the Civil Service 
Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA), seeking a 
determination that it represents the newly-created title of teaching assistant in the 
Harrison Central School District (District), and dismissing the Association's 
petition for unit clarification or unit placement (CP-820) for the same title. 
The ALJ determined that the title of teacher assistant had been included in 
CSEA's recognition clause since the 1978-81 collective bargaining agreement 
with the District and that the newly-created title of teaching assistant is the same 
title and, therefore, included in CSEA's unit. 
EXCEPTIONS 
The Association excepts to the ALJ's decision, arguing that the ALJ erred 
in interpreting our decision in Monroe-Woodbury Central School District,1 
(hereafter, Monroe-Woodbury). CSEA supports the ALJ's decision. The District 
has not responded. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
1
 33 PERB P007 (2000). 
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FACTS 
The parties stipulated to the facts upon which the ALJ based her decision. 
CSEA and the District are parties to a memorandum of agreement for the 
period July 1, 2000, to June 30, 2004. It makes no change in the recognition 
clause, most recently set forth at Article I of their prior collective bargaining 
-agreement.-effective July 1 ,-1-995-,- toJune 30, 2000,-which defines the bargaining 
unit as: 
all non-teacher personnel...performing the duties of Teacher Assistant, 
School Aide or Teacher Aide, excluding all other non-teacher personnel, 
covered by other agreements. 
Article II of the contract, entitled "Definition of Terms", which is also unchanged, 
defines the titles of school aide and teacher aide, but does not define teacher 
assistant.2 There have been no teacher assistants employed by the District 
during the term of at least the last CSEA-District collective bargaining agreement. 
The District created the title of teaching assistant by action of the Board of 
Education on January 9, 2002. However, the Board of Education resolution is 
entitled "Teacher Assistants" and the sub-title is "Authorization to Employ 
Individuals as Teacher Assistants." The resolution itself states that "the Board of 
Education hereby creates the position of teaching assistant...." 
The District notified CSEA and the Association of the creation of the new 
title by letters dated January 14, 2002. The letter to the Association from the 
Superintendent of Schools, with copy to CSEA, states: 
2
 Prior to 1995, the recognition clause referred to "all non-teaching personnel". 
The clause now refers to "all non-teacher personnel". The parties stipulated that 
this change in the wording did not constitute a change in the composition of 
CSEA's bargaining unit. 
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...the Harrison Association of Teachers (HAT) has 
taken the position that the teaching assistants should 
be included in the teachers' union.3 Although the 
District is in agreement with respect to the legal basis 
for HAT's position, the Teacher Aide union has 
refused to consent to the inclusion of teacher 
assistants in the Teachers' Union. The Teacher Aide 
Union's position is based upon the fact that the 
teaching assistant position appears in the recognition 
clause of the Teacher Aide collective bargaining unit. 
On the same day, the Superintendent wrote to CSEA, with copy to the 
Association, advising them that the Board of Education had created the title of 
teaching assistant and further stating that: 
Although I realize that the recognition clause of the 
Teacher Aide [CSEA] collective bargaining agreement 
contains the position of teaching assistant, it is the 
District's position that the inclusion of this position is 
contrary to applicable law. 
DISCUSSION 
The ALJ relied upon our decision in Monroe-Woodbury in deciding 
CSEA's unit clarification petition. In that case, we held that where a title has been 
specifically included in a unit recognition clause, a unit clarification petition 
seeking a determination that the title is within the petitioner's unit will be granted, 
with no further inquiry into the parties' practice with respect to the title. The ALJ 
reasoned that because of the recognition clause and the language in the CSEA-
District collective bargaining agreement further defining the unit, and the District's 
use of both "teaching assistant" and "teacher assistant" when referring to the at-
issue title, the parties' collective bargaining agreement clearly included the title. 
3
 The recognition clause of the Association-District collective bargaining 
agreement includes all personnel certified as teachers, and lists titles included 
and excluded from the bargaining unit. The title of "teacher assistant" or 
"teaching assistant" is not listed in the recognition clause as either an included 
title or an excluded title. 
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The Association argues that the ALJ's reliance on that case is misplaced 
because the title here at issue, teaching assistant, is not a title in CSEA's 
recognition clause. CSEA argues that the titles of teaching assistant and teacher 
assistant have been used interchangeably by the District and are included in its 
bargaining unit. 
The Association is correct thaUheiitle of teaching assistant is not 
specifically included in the recognition clause of the CSEA-District collective 
bargaining agreement; the title included in the recognition clause is teacher 
assistant. However, the CSEA-District collective bargaining agreement has 
additional language originally defining the unit as including "non-teaching 
personnel" and, now, including "non-teacher personnel", with no apparent reason 
for the use of the different terms. Therefore, a reading of the parties' contract, the 
first level of inquiry in a unit clarification petition,4 leads us to conclude, as did the 
ALJ, that the title "teacher assistant" is the same as "teaching assistant" and is 
included in the bargaining unit represented by CSEA. 
Even if it could be argued that the recognition clause is ambiguous, in the 
context of a unit clarification petition, the parties' treatment of the title would then 
be relevant to our inquiry.5 The District, in both the resolution creating the title of 
teaching assistant and in correspondence to CSEA and the Association, has 
referred to the new position interchangeably as either teaching assistant or 
teacher assistant. 
4
 See Clinton Community College, 31 PERB P070 (1998), where the recognition 
clause was title-specific but the unit clarification petition was dismissed because 
the titles sought were not listed in the recognition clause. 
5
 See County of Niagara, 21 PERB P030 (1988). 
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Based on the foregoing, we deny the Association's exceptions to the ALJ's 
decision on CSEA's unit clarification petition and affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
We find that the title of teaching assistant is included in CSEA's bargaining 
unit and we, therefore, grant CSEA's unit clarification petition. Based upon our 
grant of CSEA's unit clarification petition, we dismiss the Association's unit 
clarification/placement petition.6 
DATED: December 12, 2003 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
/ Marc A. Abbott, MerTfber 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
Because of our determination on CSEA's unit clarification petition, we need not 
reach the exceptions taken to the ALJ's determination on the unit 
clarification/placement portion of the Association's petition. 
) 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA, 
LOCAL 100, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
and CASE NO. U-23862 
NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, 
Respondent. 
KENNEDY, SCHWARTZ & CURE, P.C. (STUART LICHTEN of counsel), for 
Charging Party 
MARTIN B. SCHNABLE, VICE-PRESIDENT AND GENERAL COUNSEL 
(DANIEL TOPPER of counsel), for Respondent 
) BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the New York City Transit Authority 
(Authority) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) finding that the Authority 
violated §209-a.1 (a) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it 
denied Andrew Saloma representation by the Transport Workers Union of America, 
Local 100, AFL-CIO (TWU), during a medical examination and when it took him out of 
service for insisting on his right to TWU representation.1 
The Authority denied the material allegations of the charge and raised several 
defenses. 
1
 The TWU filed the improper practice charge which alleged violations of §§209-a.1(a) 
and (c) of the Act. The ALJ dismissed the alleged violation of §209-a.1(c); no exceptions 
have been taken to that determination. 
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EXCEPTIONS 
The Authority excepts to the ALJ's decision, arguing that he erred on the facts 
and the law. TWU supports the ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we reverse the decision of the ALJ. 
FACTS 
Saloma has been employed by the Authority as a train operator or conductor for 
20 years. He reported to the Authority's Medical Assessment Center (MAC) for his 
required biennial physical examination on June 21, 2002.2 Based upon his response to 
questions posed during the examination about drug and alcohol use, Saloma was 
referred for a psychological examination at the Authority's Employee Assistance 
Program (EAP).3 
Saloma was required to appear at the EAP Psychological Services Unit for an 
evaluation on July 17, 2002. Michael Stanton, a TWU representative, sought to attend 
the examination at Saloma's request, but was denied permission by the Authority.4 
Saloma was thereafter examined at the MAC on July 25, 2002. As a result of that 
2
 The Authority's collective bargaining agreement with the TWU provides for biennial 
physical examinations. 
3
 Our recent decision in New York City Transit Authority, 36 PERB fl3043 (October 31, 
2003), details Saloma's medical examination history. 
4
 The ALJ dismissed the allegation that Saloma was improperly denied union 
representation at this examination because the record did not support a finding that 
Saloma had specifically asked the Authority to allow a TWU representative to be 
present at the July 17 examination. No exceptions were taken to this aspect of the ALJ's 
decision. 
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examination, Saloma was recommended for participation in a chemical dependency 
relapse prevention program. A periodic re-examination was scheduled for August 30, 
2002. Saloma requested Stanton's representation and, when Stanton was denied 
permission to attend the examination, Saloma refused to participate. As a result, 
Saloma was placed in a "no work" status, which signifies that the examining physician 
does not believe the employee is capable of working. Because of his status, Saloma 
was taken out of service by the Authority on August 31, 2002. He returned to the MAC 
on September 5, 2002, at which time he was examined without a TWU representative 
present, and was thereafter returned to "full work" status.5 
The circumstances under which an employee may be required to submit to a 
drug or alcohol test are set forth in the Drugs and Controlled Substances Appendix E-1 
and the Alcohol Appendix E-2 of the parties' collective bargaining agreement.6 The 
examination scheduled for August 30, 2002, was to determine medically whether 
Saloma required further education and/or treatment. Therefore, no drug or alcohol test 
was scheduled nor could one have been required pursuant to the terms of the parties' 
collective bargaining agreement or the Authority's Rules and Regulations.7 
5
 Saloma and Stanton had appeared for the examination on September 4, 2002, but 
when Stanton was denied admission to the examination, they left. Stanton was in the 
waiting room during Saloma's September 5 examination. 
6
 Charging Party's Exhibit 1. ' 
7Charging Party's Exhibit 2. 
^ 
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DISCUSSION 
In New York City Transit Authority,8 we determined that a public employee has a 
statutory right to demand and receive, union representation in an investigatory interview 
which he or she reasonably fears may result in discipline. The ALJ found that the 
August 30, 2002, examination was an investigatory interview, making it reasonable for 
Saloma to objectively conclude that disciplinary action could result from the 
examination. The ALJ determined that Saloma was, therefore, entitled to TWU 
representation upon demand. We disagree. 
We do not find that the examination on August 30, 2002, was an investigatory 
interview which Saloma could reasonably conclude would lead to discipline. The ALJ 
correctly noted that the August 30 examination was a follow-up to Saloma's earlier 
evaluations and examinations to determine the outcome of Saloma's referral to an 
alcohol/drug relapse prevention program. At that time, Saloma was in full work status. 
No alcohol or drug test was scheduled for the August 30 examination. Discipline, 
pursuant to the parties' collective bargaining agreement and the Authority's rules, would 
result if Saloma had a third positive drug or alcohol test, not from answers given in a 
medical evaluation. Since no test was scheduled, Saloma could not have reasonably 
concluded that the August 30 examination might result in discipline. The discipline that 
resulted from the August 30 examination was based upon Saloma's refusal to 
835 PERB H3029 (2002), confirmed, 196 Misc2d 523, 36 PERB fl7009 (Sup. Ct. Kings 
County 2003). 
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participate in the examination without TWU representation, not on the results of the 
examination. 
The private sector cases cited by the ALJ and referred to by TWU in its brief deal 
with situations in which employees were requested or required to submit to a drug or 
alcohol test.9 Such was not the case here. We find that United States Postal Service,™ 
provides a better analysis of the law applicable to this case. In that decision, the 
National Labor Relations Board determined that an employer-ordered doctor's 
examination of an employee who had absentee problems was outside the purview of 
NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc.,^ because no questions of an investigatory nature were 
asked of the employee during the doctor's examination, and there was insufficient 
evidence to establish that the examination was intended by management to form the 
basis for taking disciplinary or other job-affecting action against the employee because 
of past misconduct. In defining "discipline" the NLRB held that: 
We may assume, for purposes of discussion, that the 
employees involved herein reasonably believed that there 
was a possibility that the fitness for duty examination might 
have an adverse impact on their employment, (footnote 
omitted) However, it would seem to unduly expand the 
ordinary meaning of the word "discipline" - at least as it is 
understood in labor relations parlance - to make it fit into the 
instant situation. That is to say, the use of the term 
9
 See Safeway Stores, Inc., 303 NLRB 154 (1991); System 99, 289 NLRB 723 (1988). 
10
 252 NLRB 61 (1980). 
11
 420 US 251 (1974). The US Supreme Court held there that an employer violates 
§8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act when it denies an employee's request that 
a union representative be present at an investigatory interview which the employee 
reasonably believes might result in disciplinary action. 
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"discipline" in the industrial context normally means a 
punishment or penalty which is imposed upon an employee 
for violation of an employer's policy, practice, or plant rules, 
(footnote omitted)...To be sure, in the case of any individual 
employee, the results of the examination could have an 
adverse impact upon their employment, i.e., their hours 
could be shortened, they might not be able to perform the 
...work which they believed_themselyes_capable, or,jn the 
extreme case, it could be recommended that he (or she) be 
suspended for lack of ability or capacity to perform the job. 
However, this is not "discipline" in the sense of punishment 
for the breach of a rule or practice, but rather, a resolution of 
a medical problem for the health and safety of the employee, 
his fellow workers, and possibly the public with which the 
employee may come in contact.12 
Here, no questions of an investigatory nature could be asked at the August 30 
examination and the parties' procedures do not provide that any disciplinary action 
would flow from the results of the examination. What was involved were issues of 
continued treatment for Saloma, not issues involving discipline. That Saloma could 
possibly have been referred for further treatment or additional exams based upon a 
doctor's findings, does not make the examination itself an investigatory interview or the 
subsequent referral for treatment and/or counseling discipline. 
We reiterate here that a public employee has a right under the Act to union 
representation upon demand, in an investigatory interview which he or she reasonably 
believes may result in discipline. In testing the reasonableness of an employee's belief, 
we use a reasonable person standard. An employee's fear is reasonable if the 
12
 Supra, note 10, at 64. 
"> 
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interview is "calculated to form the basis for taking discipline or other job-affecting 
actions against such employee because of past misconduct,"13 or incompetence.14 
We grant the Authority's exception that the August 30, 2002 examination was not 
the type of investigatory interview that would trigger Saloma's right to representation 
under the Act and our earlier decision in New York City Transit Authority, supra, and 
reverse the ALJ's decision. Based upon our findings, we need not reach the other 
exceptions raised by the Authority. 
We find,-therefore, that the Authority did not violate §209-a.1 (a) of the Act when it 
denied Saloma's request for TWU representation at the August 30, 2002 examination or 
when it removed him from service as a result of his refusal to participate in the 
examination without TWU representation. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the instant improper practice charge must 
be, and it hereby is, dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: December 12, 2003 
Albany, New York 
13
 Id. at 61. 
14
 See, e.g., In re University of Medicine and Dentistry, 1996 NJ Lexis 792. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
EDWARD JACKSON, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-24391 
YONKERS FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, 
Respondent. 
EDWARD JACKSON, pro se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Edward Jackson to a decision of 
the Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) dismissing 
his improper practice charge which alleged that the Yonkers Federation of Teachers 
(YFT) violated §209-a.1(c) and §209-a.2(c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment 
Act (Act) from December 2001 through June 2002 by misinforming him as to his rights 
concerning classroom observations. The Director found that the charge was untimely 
and, even if timely, failed to state facts which, if proven, would establish the violations 
alleged.1 
1
 Jackson had been earlier advised that his charge was deficient in that an employee 
organization cannot violate §209-a.1(c) of the Act and that Jackson had neither 
identified his employer nor named his employer as a respondent. 
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EXCEPTIONS 
Jackson filed exceptions to the Director's decision alleging that any defects in the 
charge, as amended, resulted from his ignorance of PERB's Rules of Procedure (Rules) 
and, nevertheless, such defects should be overlooked in the interests of justice. YFT 
has not filed a response to the exceptions. 
- Based uponour reviewoltherecord and ..o.ur_co.nsideration_oLJackson'.s__.. 
arguments, we must dismiss his exceptions as untimely filed. 
DISCUSSION 
Section 213.2(a) of the Rules requires a party filing exceptions with PERB to also 
serve those exceptions on all other parties within the same 15 working day period and, 
in addition, to file proof of such service with us. It is clear from the record that YFT2 was 
not served with Jackson's exceptions within the time required under our Rules. As a 
) • " 
result, Jackson failed to timely file proof of service with PERB as required by the Rules. 
Jackson contends that we should ignore our Rules because he is filing his 
petition as a pro se. While we have been somewhat lenient in the content of pleadings 
received from pro se parties, we have never sacrificed adherence to our Rules for the 
benefit of pro se parties.3 
In Town/City of Poughkeepsie Water Treatment Facility,4 we stated: 
2
 Jackson also served a copy of his exceptions simultaneously on the principal of 
Lincoln High School. 
3
 Board ofEduc. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of New York and United Fed'n of 
Teachers, 34 PERB P037 (2001). See also Transport Workers Union of Greater New 
York, 32 PERB 1(3004 (1999); CSEA (Juszczak), 22 PERB 1J3020 (1989). 
; 
4
 35 PERB 1J3037, at 3105-06 (2002). 
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We have consistently held that timely service upon other parties is 
a component of timely filing. Consequently, we will dismiss 
exceptions that have not been timely served. In prior decisions in 
which we have dismissed exceptions for failure of timely service, 
our decision has been prompted by an objection from one or more 
of the parties who was not timely served. -We here determine that 
requiring strict compliance with the filing requirements of our Rules 
with respect to the service of exceptions on all affected parties at 
the same time they are filed with the Board should not be 
dependent upon the urging of one of the parties to the proceeding, 
(footnotes omitted) 
Consequently, Jackson's failure to properly and timely serve exceptions upon the 
other party warrants dismissal of his exceptions.5 
Based on the foregoing, we need not reach the merits of Jackson's exceptions. 
The exceptions are, therefore, dismissed. SO ORDERED.6 
DATED: December 12, 2003 
Albany, New York 
Miebael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
5
 See City of Albany, 23 PERB 1J3027 (1990), confirmed, 181 AD2d 953, 25 PERB 
H7002 (3d Dep't 1992). 
6
 As we herein find that the exceptions have not been filed in accordance with the 
requirements of our Rules, the Director's decision is the final decision on the merits in 
) this matter. Rules, §213.6(b). 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SYRACUSE POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party, 
- a n d - CASE NO. U-22825 
CITY OF SYRACUSE, 
Respondent. 
DEPERNO & KHANZADIAN (ROCCO A. DEPERNO of counsel), for Charging 
Party 
BOND, SCHOENECK & KING, LLP (PETER JONES of counsel), for 
Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the City of Syracuse (City) to an 
Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) decision, on an improper practice charge filed by the 
Syracuse Police Benevolent Association (PBA), that found that the City violated §§209-
a.1(a) and (c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it temporarily 
transferred Sergeant Therese Lore to the Patrol Division in retaliation for having filed a 
grievance. The City's answer denied the material allegations of the charge. A hearing 
was held on June 12 and December 5, 2002. 
EXCEPTIONS 
The City, in its exceptions, argues that the ALJ erred on the law and the facts. 
The PBA supports the ALJ's decision. 
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Based on our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we reverse the ALJ's decision. 
FACTS 
The facts, as set forth in the ALJ's decision are in dispute.1 
Lor&has been employed by the-Syracuse-Police-Department since.Septemberl, 
1978. She was promoted to Sergeant, on or about August 15,1990. In January 1996, 
Lore was transferred to the office of Chief of Police as Public Information Officer. She 
was in that position for about three and one-half years. On May 10, 1999, Lore was 
removed from the position of Public Information Officer. On May 21, 1999, Lore filed a 
grievance over the removal. On June 3, 1999, Lore was transferred to the Technical 
Operations Section. On June 17, 1999, Lore filed a contract grievance over the 
transfer, complaining that she did not request the transfer and, therefore, her involuntary 
transfer violated the parties' collective bargaining agreement. 
On December 7, 1999, the two grievances came before an arbitrator. At that 
time, the parties entered into a stipulation of settlement in which Lore was to be 
transferred to the Crime Prevention Unit of the Community Relations Division as a 
supervisor. The settlement also provided certain other provisions which became the 
subject of a subsequent grievance alleging the City's non-compliance with the original 
settlement.2 The matter was heard by an arbitrator on July 26 and September 20, 2000. 
1
 36 PERB 1J4560 (2003). 
2
 Lore argued, among other things, that the settlement agreement provided that, as a 
supervisory employee, she did not have to wear a uniform. 
A 
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The arbitrator issued an award dated December 21, 2000 finding that the City had 
substantially complied with all the terms of the stipulation of settlement. 
Lore continued as a supervisor in the Crime Prevention Unit and, in May 2001, 
she was advised by her supervisor, Lt. Michael Rathbun, that her unit would be 
patrolling the parks beginning June4, 2001, On June 14, 2001 ^ the-PBA filed a 
grievance at Lore's request in which she alleged that the City's transfer to park patrol 
violated the settlement agreement. PBA president Jeffrey Piedmont told Police Chief 
John Falge that the PBA was going to file a grievance about Lore's transfer from the 
Crime Prevention Unit to park patrol. Falge responded with the statement "[H]ere we go 
again." On June 15, 2001, Lore's unit was transferred to the Uniform Bureau, Patrol, 
Platoon 2. Subsequent to the transfer and the filing of the grievance, Piedmont and 
Falge spoke again about the grievance and the transfer. According to Piedmont, Falge 
said that he was not punishing the other eleven officers but that Lore and the PBA were 
at fault. Piedmont testified that it was his practice to discuss possible legal action 
against the department as leverage in the hopes of effecting a compromise.3 Falge 
testified that he had criticized Piedmont in the past for not screening frivolous 
grievances4 Falge also testified that he believed that Lore's temporary transfer to park 
patrol did not violate the settlement agreement.5 
3
 Transcript, p. 106. 
4
 Transcript, pp. 218-19. 
5
 Transcript, pp. 197-200. 
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') 
On June 21, 2001, eight additional officers from the Community Policing Bureau 
assigned to the schools as School Information Officers (SIRP's) were transferred to the 
Uniform Bureau, Patrol, Platoon 2. 
Falge also testified that during a discussion with the Deputy Chiefs concerning 
redeployment ofofficers to parks patrol, there was no..mention of individuals..to..be. _ 
redeployed. He stated that: "We don't deal in names. We have to deal in bodies."6 
When asked whether Falge considered Lore individually in the transfer decision, he 
answered: "[Absolutely not."7 Falge testified that Lore's grievances had no effect on 
the decision to assign her to patrol.8 
Deputy Chief Robert Tassone testified, on cross-examination, that he was in 
command of the Crime Prevention Unit and SIRP officers. During the Deputy Chiefs' 
) 
meeting on June 14, 2001, he stated that his bureau was able to redeploy these officers 
to patrol because they were regarded within the department as a luxury.9 Tassone was 
disappointed that "[he] had to sacrifice most of [his] Crime Prevention Unit, but the 
needs of the department [came] first."10 Tassone's disappointment came from his belief 
that he had an obligation to keep his personnel within his bureau.11 
6
 Transcript, p. 189. 
7
 Transcript, p. 190. 
8
 Transcript, pp. 191-92. 
9
 Transcript, pp. 140-41. 
10
 Transcript, p. 142. 
> 11 Transcript, p. 143. 
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Lieutenant Thomas Rathbun is also in the unit represented by the PBA. He 
testified that Tassone informed him late in the day on June 14, 2001, of the decision to 
redeploy Lore's unit and the SIRP officers from parks to patrol12 and that they would be 
assigned to days.13 He testified that Lore's grievances were not a factor in the decision 
to transfer her unitto patrol.14 He had a conversation with her and her subordinates and 
he emphatically explained to them that Lore's grievance activity had nothing to do with 
the decision. Rathbun was adamant that the transfers were not in retaliation against 
Lore because of her grievance activity.15 He stated that "[he] would not have been a 
party to that; [he] wouldn't have allowed that to happen with people that I worked with."16 
Rathbun described the need for additional personnel in patrol during the summer: 
Q. Okay. Are there more calls in the summer for police help? 
A. Yeah. This is a fact, there's no question about it. In part its 
due to warmer weather, people are out of their houses. You'll 
see alcoholic consumption increase dramatically because of 
the weather. 
Again, I'm in charge of schools; and with the influx of twenty-
three thousand or more children to the streets or 
neighborhoods, your call load - calls for service - increase 
proportionately.17 
12
 Transcript, p. 154. 
13
 Transcript, p. 156. 
14
 Transcript, pp. 156-57. 
15
 Transcript, p. 171. 
16
 Transcript, p. 171. 
17
 Transcript, p. 156. 
Board - U-22825 - 6 
Piedmont, Rathbun and Falge testified that every summer officers from 
community relations are transferred to patrol.18 Falge added that "I think it was done 
every summer in my entire twenty-eight years . . . depending on what the crime rate 
was and what activity was."19 Falge also testified that the reason to deploy the Crime 
Prevention OfficersandSIRP officers to patrols was asihe result of street crime -
incidents. "I kind of put the kibosh on it [the commitment to neighborhoods to do the 
best we could in the parks, street security and safety comes first]."20 
On August 31, 2001, the PBA filed the instant improper practice charge as 
amended, alleging, inter alia, that on June 1, 2001, Lore was involuntarily reassigned to 
hours and duties inconsistent with the terms of a settlement agreement. 
DISCUSSION 
Among the many exceptions the City raised to the ALJ's finding of fact and 
conclusions of law,21 is its contention that the ALJ failed to defer the improper practice 
charge to the parties' grievance arbitration mechanism. 
At the hearing held on June 12, 2002, the City moved to defer this charge to the 
grievance arbitration provision in the parties' collective bargaining agreement. The 
grounds for such motion were that the PBA has a grievance pending over the transfer of 
Lore to the parks detail as a violation of their prior settlement. The hearing ALJ denied 
18Transcript, pp. 98, 154-55, 191. 
19
 Transcript, p. 191. 
20
 Transcript, p. 188. 
21
 At the close of the hearing, the ALJ advised the parties that because his retirement 
was imminent, the decision would be written by another ALJ. The City's exceptions 
were taken to the decision written by the successor ALJ. 
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the motion from the bench on the grounds that, under PERB's case law, charges 
alleging violations of §§209-a.1 (a) and (c) are not deferred. We agree that the charge 
should not have been deferred. Our reasons for such a rule have been discussed in 
prior Board decisions.22 As we noted in Riverhead Central School District,23 we do not 
usually defer a charga alleging violations of §§209-a.1(a) and(c) even ifthere is a 
pending grievance dealing with the subject matter of the charge. 
Turning to the merits of the charge, we have long held that in order to establish 
improper motivation under §§209-a.1 (a) and (c) of the Act, a charging party must prove 
that (a) he/she had engaged in protected activities, (b) the respondent had knowledge 
of those activities and (c) the respondent acted because of those activities.24 
The City, in its exceptions to the ALJ's decision, argues that the PBA has failed 
to establish a prima facie case under our case law. We agree. There is no question that 
the PBA filed a number of grievances on Lore's behalf. We have upheld the right of an 
employee to seek the assistance of his or her union.25 An employee's statement of his 
11
 See State of New York (Div. of State Police), 35 PERB 1J3031 (2002); Schuyler-
Chemung-Tioga BOCES., 34 PERB 1J3019 (2001); Riverhead Cent. Sch. Dist, 32 
PERB 1J3070 (1999); Connetquot Cent. Sch. Dist, 19 PERB 1J3045 (1986). 
23
 Supra note 22. 
24
 Town of Independence, 23 PERB fi3020 (1990). See also Convention Ctr. Operating 
Corp., 29 PERB 1J3022 , petition for review dismissed as untimely, 29 PERB fl7023 
(Sup. Ct. New York County 1996); City of Rye, 28 PERB P067 (1995), confirmed sub 
nom. DeVito v. Kinsella, 234 AD2d 640, 29 PERB 1J7021 (3d Dep't 1996). 
25See Cayuga-Onondaga BOCES, 32 PERB P079 (1999), confirmed sub nom. Hoey v, 
PERB, 284 AD2d 633, 34 PERB 1J7023 (3d Dep't 2001). 
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or her intent to do so is likewise protected by the Act.26 The record is also 
uncontroverted that Falge was aware of Lore's grievance activities. However, we find 
that Falge did not retaliate against Lore because of her grievance activities nor were 
they a factor in the decision to transfer Lore, the rest of her unit, and the SIRP unit to 
park patroli27 —-
The record lacks evidence that the City would not have acted but for Lore's 
protected activities. An employer's conduct must be deliberate in order for us to find a 
violation of §§209-a.1(a) and (c) of the Act.28 The ALJ found Falge's June 14, 2001 
conversation with Piedmont significant in demonstrating that the City's action was in 
response to Lore's protected activity. The ALJ concluded from this conversation that 
Piedmont was trying to avoid a problem whereas Falge, by his remark, "here we go 
again," was going to exacerbate the situation with Lore's transfer to park patrol. Upon 
this record, we find that the ALJ mischaracterized Falge's remark as an expression of 
anti-union animus rather than frustration over what he perceived to be a frivolous 
grievance. The ALJ's conclusion that Falge's conversation with Piedmont placing the 
responsibility for the transfers on the PBA evidences animus is contradicted by the 
record and Piedmont's cross-examination about his conversation with Falge. Piedmont 
Zb
 See State of New York (State Univ. of New York at Oswego), 34 PERB H3035 (2001), 
confirmed, 301 AD2d 946, 36 PERB 1J7003 (3d Dep't 2003). 
27
 Transcript, pp. 190, 196. 
See Greenburgh #11 Union Free Sen. Dist, 33 PERB 1J3018 (2000). 
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admitted that Falge jokes around a lot and that he does not believe everything Falge 
says is one hundred percent accurate.29 
We are cognizant that the labor relations process must tolerate robust debate of 
employment issues, even if occasionally intemperate.30 This concept was ignored by 
the ALJ in evaluating the record and the conversations between Piedmont and Falge, in 
reaching her conclusion that the PBA had made out a prima facie case based upon 
Falge's statements. It is only when the charging party makes out a prima facie case 
that the burden of going forward to establish a legitimate business purpose shifts to the 
respondent.31 An employer may impose adverse personnel actions for a good reason, 
a bad reason, or no reason at all, so long as it is not a reason proscribed by the Act. It is 
incumbent upon the charging party to sufficiently establish the alleged improper 
motivation prompting the employer's actions before an analysis by the ALJ of the 
legitimacy of the reasons offered to justify it.32 We find that the PBA failed to establish 
improper motivation on the part of the City because we do not find that Falge's remarks 
provide sufficient evidence of animus. 
Even if we were to consider the City's proffered reasons for the transfer, we 
would find no violation. The ALJ found that the City's offered business reason was 
pretextual because there was an absence of any evidence that the summer of 2001 was 
extraordinary by any measure that would require the transfer of personnel, including 
29
 Transcript, p. 97. 
30
 See Town of Greenburgh, 32 PERB fl3025 (1999). 
31
 State of New York(SUNY- Oswego), 34 PERB 1J3017 (2001). 
J 3 2 / d . 
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Lore, to park patrol. Thus, the ALJ found that, but for Lore's grievances, she would not 
have been transferred to patrol. We disagree. The City's witnesses all testified as to the 
need for the additional personnel assigned to park patrol. There is nothing in the record 
to controvert the reasons offered by the City for its decision to deploy Lore and the other 
personnel to the park patrol _... ._ .. 
The ALJ also found that the speed of the transfer caught Lore's immediate 
superior unaware and, therefore, the proximity of time between Lore's grievance and 
the transfer raised a suspicion of a causal relationship. In the absence of any evidence 
of animus, however, timing alone is insufficient to support a finding of violations of 
§§209-a.1(a) and (c).33 Furthermore, a coincidence of events alone is insufficient to 
justify such an inference.34 
) 
The PBA has merely demonstrated that it filed a grievance on Lore's behalf and 
that Falge was aware of her grievance and past grievance activity. The PBA has failed 
to prove that "but for" this grievance Lore would not have been temporarily transferred 
from community relations to patrol during the summer of 2001. 
Based upon our review of the record, we grant the City's exceptions and reverse 
the decision of the ALJ. 
33
 See County of Monroe and Monroe County Sheriff, 33 PERB P044 (2000); Town of 
North Hempstead, 32 PERB 1J3006 (1999). 
34
 See HolbrookFire Dist, 33 PERB 1J3050 (2000), confirmed, 295 AD2d 668, 35 PERB 
1J7011, (3d Dep't 2002). 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed in its entirety.36 
DATED: December 12, 2003 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
/ ) tixC'to 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
Member Abbott recused himself from consideration of this case. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE TROOPERS, INC., 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-22896 
STATE OF NEW YORK (DIVISION OF STATE 
POLICE), 
Respondent. 
GLEASON, DUNN, WALSH & O'SHEA (RONALD G. DUNN of counsel), for 
Charging Party 
WALTER J. PELLEGRINI, GENERAL COUNSEL (MICHAEL N. VOLFORTE of 
Counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions to an Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) 
decision dismissing an improper practice charge, filed by the Police Benevolent 
Association of the New York State Troopers, Inc., (Association) against the State of 
New York (Division of State Police) (State) alleging, as amended, that the State violated 
§§209-a.1(a) and (d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) by unilaterally 
changing a past practice when it denied annual leave in one-day increments to a troop 
commander, Major Walter Heesch, Jr. 
Board - U-22896 -2 
The State filed an answer that, inter alia, admitted denying the leave request but 
asserted that Heesch had been advised at the time of his appointment that his required 
work week was Monday through Friday.1 
PROCEDURAL MATTERS 
By decision dated December 26, 2001,2 the case was deferred to the parties' 
contractual grievance procedure by the ALJ assigned to the case.3 The arbitrator 
dismissed the Association's grievance by award dated May 12, 2002, finding that there 
was no meaningful past practice of granting one-day leave requests to majors under the 
circumstances set forth in the grievance. The Association then moved to reopen the 
improper practice charge, arguing that the State's denial of Heesch's requests 
established a new annual leave policy that had not been negotiated with the 
Association. By letter dated July 29, 2002, the same ALJ granted the Association's 
request to reopen the improper practice charge, finding that this issue had not been 
covered by the arbitrator's decision. However, the ALJ precluded the Association from 
relitigating the issue of an existing past practice, finding that the arbitrator's decision 
1
 Heesch had made requests for one-day leave on Wednesdays and Fridays in the 
summer months. 
2
 34 PERB 1J4612 (2001). 
3
 In accordance with our long-standing policy, the alleged violation of §209-a.1(a) would 
have been deferred as it is purely derivative of the alleged §209-a.1(d) violation, no 
independent facts which would support a finding of improper motivation having been 
pled by the Association. PERB does not ordinarily defer an alleged §209-a.1(a) 
violation. See, Schuyler-Chemung-Tioga BOCES, 34 PERB fl3019 (2001). 
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must be given preclusive effect on that issue because it had been fully litigated in the 
arbitration. 
The Association requested a hearing on the issue. The ALJ assigned to decide 
the reopened improper practice charge4 directed the Association to file an offer of proof 
and, thereafter, issued a letter ruling on the Association's offer and the State's response 
to the offer, determining that there would be no hearing. The ALJ then decided the 
charge based on the pleadings, the arbitration award, the Association's offer of proof, 
the State's response thereto, and the letter rulings described supra. Finding that 
collateral estoppel applied, the ALJ gave the arbitrator's award preclusive effect and 
determined that the denial of Heesch's one-day leave requests did not contravene the 
parties' past practice and, therefore, did not constitute a unilateral change in practice.5 
EXCEPTIONS 
The Association excepted to the ALJ's decision on the grounds that the ALJ 
erred by precluding the Association from relitigating the issue of past practice in the 
present improper practice charge. The State filed a response in support of the ALJ's 
decision. 
Based on our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the ALJ's decision. 
4
 The prior ALJ subsequently retired. 
5
 The ALJ also dismissed the alleged §209-a.1(a) violation as derivative of the §209-
a.1 (d) allegation. No exceptions have been taken to this aspect of the ALJ's decision. 
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FACTS 
The facts are set forth in the ALJ's decision.6 We will confine our review to the 
facts relevant to these exceptions. 
The amended charge alleges that employees in the Association's bargaining 
unit, including majors, were consistently permitted to take annual leave in one-day 
increments. Heesch made such a request on June 26, 2001, that was denied by the 
Field Commander, Colonel William DeBlock. Heesch was thereafter informed by 
DeBlock that he could not take annual leave in one-day increments. 
The Association then filed a grievance, alleging that the State violated the parties' 
collective bargaining agreement when DeBlock denied Heesch's request for one day of 
vacation leave for June 27, 20017 The arbitrator found that DeBlock had previously 
notified Heesch that, as a major commanding a troop, he was expected to maintain a 
Monday through Friday work schedule and that requests for one-day leaves would not 
be routinely granted. Finding that Heesch's repeated one-day leave requests were 
attempts to alter his regular Monday to Friday work schedule and that DeBlock's denial 
and notification were to prevent that alteration, the arbitrator identified the dispute as 
whether one-day leave requests which attempt to create a work week other than 
Monday through Friday can be denied. In denying the grievance, the arbitrator found 
that the parties' past practice of granting one-day leave requests did not include allowing 
6
 36 PERB 1f4558 (2003). 
7
 The Association argued that Article 13.1 of the parties' collective bargaining 
agreement, dealing with annual leave, was violated by DeBlock's denial. 
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majors to utilize leave in one-day increments, under the circumstances set forth in the 
grievance. The arbitrator found that no provisions of the collective bargaining agreement 
had been violated. 
DISCUSSION 
The Association argues in its exceptions that it" should not have been precluded 
from relitigating the issue of past practice based upon the arbitration award. The 
Association contends that, since the arbitrator determined the grievance was not 
covered by the collective bargaining agreement and, as a result, his authority was 
limited, he did not conclusively determine the issue of whether a past practice existed. 
During the arbitration, the Association proved that there had been a practice of 
granting annual leave in one-day increments, and, in fact, the arbitrator acknowledged 
this fact in his award. The arbitrator made a two-part determination on past practice: 
one, on the extent of the practice, finding that the practice did not include majors; and, 
two, finding that the practice shed no light on the disputed contractual language. The 
fact that the arbitrator denied the grievance on contractual grounds does not mean that 
collateral estoppel does not apply to the past practice issues litigated in the arbitration. 
We have long held that, as to any factual issues, or mixed question of law and 
fact, necessarily resolved by an arbitrator in arriving at his or her determination, the 
principle of res judicata is applicable.8 The doctrine of collateral estoppel is but a 
corollary to the doctrine of res judicata, so that a party is precluded from relitigating in a 
New York City Transit Auth., 32 PERB1J3057 (1999) (later history omitted). 
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subsequent action or preceeding an issue actually litigated and necessarily determined 
in a prior proceeding, whether or not the tribunals or causes of action are the same.9 
The doctrine of collateral estoppel prevents parties from relitigating, in a 
subsequent proceeding, an issue of fact or law "clearly raised in a prior action or 
proceeding and decided against that party or those in privity, whether or not the 
tribunals or causes of action are the same."10 Collateral estoppel will be imposed where 
it is shown that the issue previously decided was "material to the first action or 
proceeding and essential to the decision rendered therein,"11 and the party against 
whom it is sought to be imposed had a full and fair opportunity in the proceeding to 
contest the decision now said to be controlling.12 
We find that there was an identity of issues in both the improper practice charge 
and the grievance arbitration, specifically, the alleged past practice of granting one-day 
annual leave requests The record demonstrates that the Association had a full and fair 
opportunity to litigate the alleged past practice before the arbitrator and the Association 
takes no exception to this point. We find unpersuasive the Association's argument that, 
since the arbitrator determined that the parties' contractual grievance procedure was 
limited to disputes over the interpretation or application of the term of the agreement, 
and since a past practice that stands alone without ties to the contract is not reviewable 
9
 Ryan v. New York Telephone Co., 62 NY2d 494 (1984). 
10
 Id. at 500. 
11
 Id. 
12
 Id. at 501. 
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as a contract grievance, the arbitrator did not conclusively determine the issue of 
whether a past practice existed. The arbitrator determined that the Association 
presented evidence of the past practice. He then made findings as to the nature and 
extent of the past practice and whether the past practice, as established by the 
Association, lent any clarification to the contract provisions under which the grievance 
was brought. The arbitrator found that there was no relevant past practice as it related 
to the at-issue dispute. The Association, under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, is 
barred from re-litigating that issue in this proceeding. 
As no past practice of granting one-day annual leave requests was altered by 
DeBIock's denial of Heesch's June 26, 2001 request, we find that the State neither 
unilaterally changed a past practice nor unilaterally implemented a new annual leave 
policy. 
Based on the foregoing, we deny the Association's exceptions and affirm the 
decision of the ALJ. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED, that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: December 12, 2003 
Albany, New York 
Michel R. Cuevas, Chairman 
/A 
f Marc A. Abbott, MeSrfber 
ohn T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
VILLAGE OF DRYDEN POLICE BENEVOLENT 
ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, .... 
- and - CASE NO. C-5283 
VILLAGE OF DRYDEN, 
Employer. 
JOHN M. CROTTY, ESQ., for Petitioner 
FERRARA, FIORENZA, LARRISON, BARRETT & REITZ, P.C. (DAVID W. 
LARRISON, ESQ. of Counsel), for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On March 5, 2003, the Village of Dryden Police Benevolent Association 
(petitioner) filed, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the Public Employment 
Relations Board, a timely petition seeking certification as the exclusive representative of 
certain employees of the Village of Dryden. 
Thereafter, the parties executed a consent agreement in which they stipulated 
that the following negotiating unit was appropriate: 
Included: All full-time and part-time Police Officers. 
Excluded: Chief of Police, Lieutenant and all other employees of the Village 
of Dryden. 
Pursuant to that agreement, a secret-ballot election was held on October 17, 
2003, at which a majority of ballots were cast against representation by the petitioner. 
Case No. C-5283 
Inasmuch as the results of the election indicate that a majority of the eligible 
voters in the unit who cast ballots do not desire to be represented for the purpose of 
collective bargaining by the petitioner, IT IS ORDERED that the petition should be, and 
jt hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: December 12, 2003 
Albany, New York 
Midjiael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
7
 " Marc A. Abbott, Member 
n T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, 
CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN, AND HELPERS 
OF AMERICA, LOCAL 264, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5208 
COUNTY OF ERIE AND ERIE COUNTY SHERIFF, 
Employer, 
-and-
ERIE COUNTY SHERIFF'S POLICE BENEVOLENT 
ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Intervenor.1 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
1
 While the Erie County Sheriff's Police Benevolent Association, Inc., originally 
intervened and argued that its unit was the most appropriate for the at-issue 
employees, it thereafter consistently indicated no interest in representing these 
employees. 
Certification - C-5208 page 2 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen, and Helpers of America, Local 264 has been designated 
and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit found to be appropriate and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Included: All Mounted Reserve Deputies. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, 
Warehousemen, and Helpers of America, Local 264. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with 
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a 
written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. 
Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the 
making of a concession. 
DATED: December 12, 2003 
Albany, New York 
johael R. CuevaS, Chairman 
//rJ/M&rc A. Abbott, Membe 
/ (John T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TOWN OF RAMAPO STAFF ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASENO.C-5181 
TOWN OF RAMAPO, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Town of Ramapo Staff Association has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public 
employer, in the unit found to be appropriate and described below, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Included: All full-time and part-time employees in the titles of Maintenance 
Mechanic II (Director of Buildings and Grounds), Engineer III 
Certification - C-5181 page 2 
Excluded: 
(Deputy Director of Public Works), Senior Program Assistant & 
Grant Writer, Deputy Town Clerk, Justice Court Clerk, Recreation 
Activities Manager, Building Inspector II (Director of Building, 
Planning & Zoning), Recreation Facilities Manager (Deputy 
Director, Recreation), Assessor B (Director of Assessment & 
Taxation), and Director of Youth Counseling. 
Personnel Administrator^ Director-of Finance,r Receiver of Taxes, 
Town Clerk, Director of Parks & Recreation, and Director of Public 
Works. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Town of Ramapo Staff Association. The duty to negotiate 
collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in 
good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, 
or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by 
either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or 
require the making of a concession. 
DATED: December 12, 2003 
Albany, New York 
ichael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
k 
7 V Marc A. Abbott, Member " * 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
